On August 5, Sergei Shoigu, one of Russia’s top military figures, arrived in Tehran for formal meetings, where he promised his country’s “full cooperation” with Iran. His visit coincided with Russian deliveries of radar and air-defense technology that would help Iran to defend against a possible Israeli attack. In Avigdor Haselkorn’s view, these gestures of support reflect an ever-closer alliance among Russia, Iran, Syria, and North Korea:

A good example of the operation of this radical entente came on Sunday, August 11, 2024, when Moscow launched drone and missile attacks against the Kyiv region. According to Mykola Oleshchuk, the Ukrainian air-force commander, the Russians employed, among other weapons, North Korean KN-23 ballistic missiles and Iran-made Shahed kamikaze drones.

On January 8, 2024, the National Intelligence Service (NIS) of South Korea verified that Hamas had been using weapons from North Korea in its war with Israel in Gaza. The NIS released a photo of a North Korean F-7 rocket-propelled grenade with Korean letters inscribed on it. In addition, Israeli forces operating in Gaza had reportedly found North Korean Bang-122 artillery shells and 122mm multiple-rocket launchers.

Haselkorn argues that Israel’s current situation must be seen in light of these global alignments:

A serious U.S. undertaking would . . . seek to take advantage of the Ukrainian offensive against Russia to undermine the entente and reshape the global power balance. To this end, it would give Israel the green light simultaneously to launch an offensive to remove the Hizballah threat on Israel’s northern border. Both Russia and Iran would be put under pressure. Iran’s ability to assist Russia would be curtailed given that its main strategic asset in the region—Hizballah—was being hammered and in need of support, which will aid Ukraine—Biden’s core interest.

In turn, the greater Ukraine’s battlefield successes, the more Russia’s ability to help Iran comes into question and the stronger would be the mullahs’ disincentives to intervene to rescue their Lebanese proxy.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.