A successful large-scale Iranian attack on Israel of the kind that would require a decisive response from Jerusalem would certainly constitute a significant escalation of the current war. And judging from the social-media feeds of former diplomats and the headlines of CNN, the New York Times, and other outlets, that should be everyone’s biggest fear. This also seems to be the view of the Biden administration, which is constantly urging restraint and sending diplomats to deescalate tensions. Efraim Inbar examines the flaws of such thinking:

In many situations, climbing the escalation ladder is probably the best way to put an end to violence. Indeed, the Hamas raids and atrocities are a direct result of the containment policy conducted for years by Israel. Instead of escalating and exacting a high price from Hamas to change its strategic calculus, Israel preferred to absorb many rocket attacks and refrained from a strong riposte that could lead to escalation. This only gave time to Hamas to build its military capabilities and acquire the might to withstand an Israeli offensive now in its tenth month.

Similarly, Israel’s reluctance to preempt in Lebanon allowed Hizballah to build a formidable missile arsenal. This organization grew to become a monster that since October 8 has conducted, undeterred, a war of attrition against Israel. Attrition warfare is the best outcome for the population-centric Iranian strategy and the worst possible scenario for Israel. . . . Only escalation intended to eliminate the missile arsenal can put an end to the war of attrition.

War against Hizballah is inevitable; Israel might have to wait for more hospitable circumstances, but they will come.

Yesterday, the beepers used by hundreds of Hizballah operatives were detonated. Noah Rothman puts this ingenious attack in the context of the overall war between Israel and the Iran-backed terrorist group:

[W]hile the disabling of an untold number of Hizballah operatives is remarkable, it’s also ominous. This week, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant told reporters that the hour is nearing when Israeli forces will have to confront Iran’s cat’s-paw in southern Lebanon directly, in order to return the tens of thousands of Israelis who fled their homes along Lebanon’s border under fire and have not yet been able to return. Today’s operation may be a prelude to the next phase of Israel’s defensive war, a dangerous one in which the IDF will face off against an enemy with tens of thousands of fighters and over 150,000 rockets and missiles trained on Israeli cities.

Seth Frantzman, meanwhile, focuses on the specific damage the pager bombings have likely done to Hizballah:

This will put the men in hospital for a period of time. Some of them can go back to serving Hizballah, but they will not have access to one of their hands. These will most likely be their dominant hand, meaning the hand they’d also use to hold the trigger of a rifle or push the button to launch a missile.

Hizballah has already lost around 450 fighters in its eleven-month confrontation with Israel. This is a significant loss for the group. While Hizballah can replace losses, it doesn’t have an endlessly deep [supply of recruits]. This is not only because it has to invest in training and security ahead of recruitment, but also because it draws its recruits from a narrow spectrum of Lebanese society.

The overall challenge for Hizballah is not just replacing wounded and dead fighters. The group will be challenged to . . . roll out some other way to communicate with its men. The use of pagers may seem archaic, but Hizballah apparently chose to use this system because it assumed the network could not be penetrated. . . . It will also now be concerned about the penetration of its operational security. When groups like Hizballah are in chaos, they are more vulnerable to making mistakes.