Iran, for its part, has been promising to avenge Ismail Haniyeh’s death, and Israelis are preparing for another massive attack along the lines of April 13, but of greater duration and intensity. The situation is a reminder of what Benjamin Netanyahu conveyed to the U.S. Congress in his July 24 address: Iran is the greatest threat to Israel, and a serious threat to America as well. James Stavridis agrees:

Tehran has repeatedly sworn that Israel should be “eliminated” and “wiped off the map,” so no Israeli government will countenance a nuclear-armed Iran. Both the Biden and Trump administrations gave Israel assurances that the U.S. will not tolerate such a leap, either. If Tehran seriously pursues the bomb—something that will likely become clear in the next year or so—there will be tremendous pressure on whichever U.S. administration is in power to take military action.

In such a situation, Hizballah would undoubtedly unleash its arsenal of more than 120,000 missiles against Israeli civilians across the small country. This scenario was a big reason the Biden administration sent two aircraft carriers to the region last fall. If it came to war with Tehran, it would take four aircraft carriers—and likely a massive U.S. air-force surge into bases in the Arab states Qatar, Kuwait, and even Saudi Arabia.

Netanyahu’s speech reminded me of what Churchill later called “a gathering storm” in Europe in the late 1930s, which led to World War II. It is beginning to feel that way in the Middle East today.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.