While people don’t normally think about terrorist groups engaging in diplomacy, that is precisely what they do, often with considerable success. Aaron Zelin examines how Hamas’s diplomatic corps has fared since October 7:

Beyond its traditional allies, Hamas has also engaged politicians and civil-society actors in various parts of Africa to garner greater international support. During a week-long diplomatic marathon in Algiers this February, Hamas described meeting with “30 political parties and ten associations, and holding meetings with media outlets and Algerian notables.”

In Mauritania, the Hamas leader Khaled Meshal gave a speech at a November festival in support of the Palestinian cause. In Nigeria, Hamas conducted a four-day visit in February that included meeting with political officials and religious actors to explain the situation in Gaza. In South Africa, Hamas officials conducted multiple trips to Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, and Johannesburg, meeting with various political actors (e.g., the African National Congress), local NGOs, and religious figures.

The group has also attempted to situate itself as the sole voice on Palestine, in part by praising countries for taking actions it perceives as beneficial to the Palestinian cause.

Those countries include Ireland, Norway, Slovenia, Turkey, and Brazil. The one positive note Zelin makes is that Ismail Haniyeh, long the group’s chief diplomat, is now dead. Zelin adds:

Washington should also do more to curb the major increase in Hamas diplomatic engagement on the world stage—otherwise, the group could wind up being legitimized as the sole voice of Palestine despite starting a destructive war and losing much of its infrastructure in Gaza. For example, the State Department could exert far more pressure on U.S. allies and partners that host or meet with Hamas. If private conversations or official demarches do not have the desired effect, the administration may need to call these countries out publicly.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.