Considering the current degraded state of American higher education, Yuval Levin looks back at the campus upheavals of the 1970s, when “the people running the university were gradually choosing to cooperate with the people who wanted to burn it down.” Yet while the revolutionaries who took over the institutions in the last quarter of the 20th century saw themselves as pioneers of free speech, the universities became increasingly censorious and intolerant—so much so that many conservative critics have come to see freedom of speech as the solution to these ills. But that’s not quite right, argues Levin:

The university cannot be understood as just another platform for saying anything you want. We have a lot of those now. What we don’t have enough of are venues for engaging in teaching and learning in pursuit of knowledge of the truth. . . . The inadequacy of free-speech arguments alone has come into clearer focus over the past year, as it has become increasingly evident that we are in a new phase of the campus crisis. This phase had an unusually distinct starting point: it began on October 7, 2023.

Hamas’s savage attack against Israel unleashed an explosion of anti-Semitic hatred on many elite American campuses, and the response from most university administrators was at best a tenuous, anemic reticence. Campus leaders suddenly rediscovered their relativism—anti-Semitism depends on the context, you may recall the president of Harvard saying. This was matched by a newfound zeal for free speech. After years of enforcing dogmatic restrictions and requirements, presidents of universities suddenly found themselves telling members of Congress that it wouldn’t be right to censure even open calls for genocide.

What this apparent reversal reveals, according to Levin, is that the real fight isn’t about freedom of speech, but about “the purpose of the university,” and so it has been since the 1960s:

The only positive effect of the campus crisis that followed October 7 has been the clarity it has provided. We have entered a phase of the university crisis in which this character of the dispute is clearer than ever. And it is therefore a phase in which the potential for some effective action against the academic revolutionaries and in defense of the traditional ethos of the university may be greater than it has been in half a century.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.