The close cooperation between Iran and Russia, countries that cemented their alliance when their forces fought side by side in Syria, is a geopolitical reality that has little purchase in the American political conversation. Thus, observes John Podhoretz, neither candidate was able to make much of a coherent foreign-policy statement in Tuesday’s presidential debate:

Simply put, Kamala Harris cannot say that America wants Israel to win its war in Gaza, and Donald Trump cannot say he wants Ukraine to win the war with Russia. Both effectively said the same thing about these different conflicts.

On Gaza, Harris said we need a ceasefire now, today, right this second, immediately, forthwith, so that we can get right back on that path to a two-state solution, which is a little like saying we need to get on a path to a sequel to Howard the Duck. She claims to be a supporter of Israel’s defense and its right to protect itself. She says she wants an end to the killing in Gaza.

[But] what an immediate ceasefire in Gaza today, this second, means is this: Israel will not finish the job. Israel will not complete its task of finishing off Hamas. It means it will have gotten 80-90 percent of the way there and then halted before unconditional surrender.

Harris cannot say she wants Israel to win because she does not want Israel to win.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.