For the most part, European relations with Israel have been characterized by extensive trade, vague expressions of support, self-righteous lecturing and condemnation, and the massive funding of anti-Israeli NGOs, often with terrorist ties. Efraim Inbar argues that the continent would be better served if it set itself firmly on the side of Israel and its Arab allies, not only for moral reasons, but also for considerations of Realpolitik:

[T]rying to save an Islamist mini-state [in Gaza] that serves Iranian interests on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean is a strategic folly; oversensitivity to the human cost in eliminating it makes little strategic sense. Its location near the Suez Canal, an important choke point and sea route, as well as to the gas deposits in the sea lends importance to who rules this area. The Europeans should appreciate efforts to minimize the presence on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean of Islamic radicals whose influence has already spread to Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and the Sinai Peninsula.

The timidity of the U.S. and its European allies in dealing with the Houthis, an Iranian proxy blocking the Bab al-Mandab Strait, an international waterway, is intriguing. Forcing naval traffic to go to Europe around Africa, instead of the Suez Canal, carries financial costs and inflicts significant damage to the economy of Egypt, a pivotal pro-Western state in the Middle East. Tolerating this situation only encourages Iran to become more aggressive in its actions in the region and less fearful of Western retaliation.

Indeed, nowadays Iran is the main source of trouble in the Middle East. If Europe is serious about minimizing the dangers emanating from the Middle East, it must adopt a more confrontational posture toward the mullahs in Teheran.

Europe should also overcome its obsession with the two-state solution.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.