Just as the situation on the Israel-Lebanon boarder was beginning to heat up, Robert Nicholson published this analysis, drawing on his recent visit to the area. He describes sitting among friends in the Upper Galilee while the Iron Dome intercepted incoming rockets:

As the missiles collided above us, I asked my friend how she and her family, Israeli Christians, got on amid such chaos. “Oh this happens every day,” she answered with a weak smile. “You get used to it.” Feeling the bumim (a Hebraicization of the English word “booms”) reverberate in my chest, I couldn’t understand how.

“How will this end?” I asked her.

“We destroy Hizballah—it’s the only way. These people only understand power.”

I knew that people back home [in the U.S.] would hear my friend’s call for a new (and more catastrophic) war in Lebanon as insane. But I also knew that most Israelis agree with her. And after seeing the situation with my own eyes, I couldn’t help but join them.

Israelis are often caricatured as warmongers, but almost always prefer quiet “live-and-let-live” deals with their enemies over military confrontations. . . . Yet many in Israel now believe it was their very aversion to war and willingness to embrace a modus vivendi in Gaza that made the horrors of October 7 possible.

The much-feared regional war is well under way—the only question now is how to end it. Paradoxically, the best answer is to skip multiple rungs on the escalation ladder and make a dramatic show of force that stops the Iranian regime in its tracks. This is where the U.S. can help.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.