Whatever decision the Israeli government makes, Michael Oren is confident that it must continue to press its advantage:

Though the terrorists have yet to unleash the full brunt of their most lethal and accurate rockets, their image has been irreparably tarnished. For that reason alone, Israel must not agree to a ceasefire that will allow Hizballah to rearm and rebuild its command structure. . . . A ceasefire that enables Hizballah to remain deployed along [Israel’s] northern border and resume daily firing at our citizens will not enable tens of thousands of displaced Israelis to return to their home.

Oren compares Israel’s current war to the U.S. experience in the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II, which began with severe, even humiliating setbacks. The past two weeks in Lebanon, he writes, have begun to resemble the crucial battles that turned those wars around:

This is Israel’s Midway moment. In Lebanon, Israel can have its Gettysburg and its Yorktown. The alternatives are the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s most recent wars that ended inconclusively with ignominious withdrawals. Israel, fighting an existential war on our own borders, must not go that route. Rather, by resisting pressure for a ceasefire that leaves Hizballah unbowed, Israel can fully restore our deterrence power and regain our regional preeminence.

It’s worth noting that it took the Union nearly two whole years to defeat the Confederacy following its victory at Gettysburg, and the war with Japan dragged on for three years after Midway. The Jewish state may well have a difficult slog ahead.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.