In a piece Mosaic published exactly one year ago today, Jonathan Schachter praised American military and rhetorical support for Israel, but also warned of the dangers of a “bear hug,” whereby U.S. aid becomes a tool for preventing the Jewish state from taking necessary actions to defend itself. Michael Oren fears Israel now finds itself in a similar situation in the wake of Iran’s October 1 missile attack, resulting in

a prolonged delay in Israel’s response that threatens our security no less than the missiles themselves. With each passing day of inaction, Israel’s casus belli grows weaker. If and when Israel acts, the world will scarcely remember why.

What, besides avoiding further friction with the White House, does Israel have to gain by waiting? . . .  Can we use the American administration’s fear of our response to Iran to secure vital concessions from Washington?

One such concession would be the president’s agreement not to oppose Israel’s implementation of General Giora Eiland’s plan to declare northern Gaza a closed military zone and then trade territory for Hamas’s release of the hostages. Another concession would be a presidential commitment to intervene militarily against Iran’s nuclear plants once they enrich uranium above 60 percent. Yet another concession would be America’s agreement to sell us long-range strategic bombers capable of dropping 15,000 kilogram bunker-buster bombs from a height that Iran’s defenses cannot reach. Such a sale would say to the Iranians “we won’t bomb your facilities this time but we have the means to do so effectively in the future.”

In the past two days, as if to confirm Oren’s suspicions, the U.S. has begun transfer of the THAAD missile-defense system to Israel while reportedly extracting a promise that Israel will not attack Iran’s oil infrastructure or nuclear program. As to what Israel is getting in return, Washington also appears to be pressuring Jerusalem not to go through with the Eiland plan.

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.