As mentioned earlier, this newsletter has looked at the anniversary of October 7 from a variety of angles, but one not yet considered is the Palestinian perspective. John Aziz provides one:

Yes, Palestinians have suffered decades of disenfranchisement, displacement, blockade, and military occupation, and these things have caused a heavy collective trauma—but this attack immediately made everything very much worse.

It put innocent Palestinians in extreme danger of being injured or killed in the inevitable subsequent war. . . . While Palestinians have many legitimate grievances—both grievances that date from before the current war and ones arising from the current war—Hamas did not start this war against Israel to resolve legitimate grievances. Instead, it started a war with the goals of conquest, domination, and terror.

In addition, Hamas intentionally wants innocent Palestinian civilians to suffer and die in order to strengthen its fighters’ resolve, and hurt Israel’s global image and relationship with the United States and Europe. Hamas’s former leader Ismail Haniyeh explicitly stated that: “We need the blood of the children, women, and elderly to . . . ignite within us the spirit of revolution.”

Hamas chose to try to settle the conflict with Israel on the battlefield. But Hamas has no recent military victories to boast of.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.