The Case for Annexing the West Bank, and Its Problems

Oct. 31 2024

In 2020, when the Israeli government was considering annexation of parts of the West Bank, Mosaic held a symposium on the topic. This proposal then gave way to the Abraham Accords, but the underlying problems remain, and look very different in light of the events of the past year. David M. Friedman, the former U.S. ambassador to Israel, was deeply involved in those diplomatic proceedings, and has now written a serious book making the case for the simplest solution: Israeli annexation of all of Judea and Samaria.

In his review, Robert Silverman praises Friedman’s arguments, and considers what this would mean for West Bank Palestinians:

Friedman has a creative solution to this conundrum: the Puerto Rico model. Puerto Ricans enjoy the full panoply of U.S. citizenship rights, except they don’t vote in national elections (although they do participate in the presidential primaries of U.S. political parties) and aren’t represented in Congress. In exchange, they don’t pay the same federal taxes as other U.S. citizens.

There are two problems with the Puerto Rico model for the West Bank. First, the majority of Puerto Ricans agree on their status in the U.S., most recently in a 2020 referendum on statehood. Friedman doesn’t mention offering West Bankers a similar referendum on becoming part of Israel. . . . Second, there is no consensus inside Israel on annexing the West Bank.

Instead, Friedman might consider reviving the Trump peace plan of 2020. It does allow Israel to annex the strategically important Jordan Valley and adjacent desert (roughly 30 percent of the West Bank) under certain conditions. Whether or not it is formally annexed to Israel, the Jordan Valley will undoubtedly remain Israel’s eastern security border. That is an Israeli consensus only strengthened by the recent Iranian-led attacks.

Read more at Jerusalem Strategic Tribune

More about: Palestinians, West Bank

Libya Gave Up Its Nuclear Aspirations Completely. Can Iran Be Induced to Do the Same?

April 18 2025

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.

Read more at Washington Times

More about: Iran nuclear program, Iraq war, Libya, U.S. Foreign policy