Meanwhile, Israel won’t be taking its eyes off its campaign against Hizballah, especially since it has initiated ground maneuvers in Lebanon. In fact, retaliation against Iran may depend on the extent that the IDF can curb Hizballah’s ability to strike back against Israel. It is not clear, however, what the extent of the operations in Lebanon will be. Yoav Limor examines the possibilities:

The IDF is weighing three main options. The first is a limited maneuver near the border to destroy key Hizballah infrastructure. This targeted operation would be confined in scope and time and could be wrapped up in weeks. The second option involves advancing up to the Litani River to hit infrastructure further from the border. The third option would take Israeli forces north of the Litani to inflict deeper damage on Hizballah’s capabilities and personnel.

The decision will likely depend on three factors: the level of damage inflicted on Hizballah, the toll on Israeli soldiers’ lives (including the risk of captives), and the potential for a prolonged engagement in Lebanon. These considerations suggest that Israel may lean toward the first option, limiting its actions to the border area and a short timeframe. This approach would help reduce international pressure stemming from the invasion of Lebanese territory while still preserving Israel’s sense of achievement and Hizballah’s perception of defeat.

How did Qatar, an American ally, become the nerve center of the leading Palestinian jihadist group? Natalie Ecanow explains.

When Jordan expelled Hamas in 1999, Qatar offered sanctuary to the group, which had already become notorious for using suicide-bombing attacks over the previous decade. . . . Hamas chose to relocate to Syria. However, that arrangement lasted for only a decade. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the terror group found its way back to Qatar.

In 2003, Hamas leaders reportedly convened in Qatar after the IDF attempted to eliminate Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, following a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed seven people, including two American citizens. This episode led to one of the first efforts by Qatar to advocate for its terror proxy.

Thirteen years and five wars between Hamas and Israel later, Qatar’s support for Hamas has not waned. . . . To this day, Qatari officials maintain that the office came at the “request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas.” However, an Obama White House official asserted that there was never any request from Washington. . . . Inexplicably, the United States government continues to rely on Qatar to negotiate for the release of the hostages held by Hamas, even as the regime hosts the terror group’s political elite.

A reckoning is needed between our two countries. Congressional hearings, legislation, executive orders, and other measures to regulate relations between our countries are long overdue.