Meanwhile, Israel won’t be taking its eyes off its campaign against Hizballah, especially since it has initiated ground maneuvers in Lebanon. In fact, retaliation against Iran may depend on the extent that the IDF can curb Hizballah’s ability to strike back against Israel. It is not clear, however, what the extent of the operations in Lebanon will be. Yoav Limor examines the possibilities:

The IDF is weighing three main options. The first is a limited maneuver near the border to destroy key Hizballah infrastructure. This targeted operation would be confined in scope and time and could be wrapped up in weeks. The second option involves advancing up to the Litani River to hit infrastructure further from the border. The third option would take Israeli forces north of the Litani to inflict deeper damage on Hizballah’s capabilities and personnel.

The decision will likely depend on three factors: the level of damage inflicted on Hizballah, the toll on Israeli soldiers’ lives (including the risk of captives), and the potential for a prolonged engagement in Lebanon. These considerations suggest that Israel may lean toward the first option, limiting its actions to the border area and a short timeframe. This approach would help reduce international pressure stemming from the invasion of Lebanese territory while still preserving Israel’s sense of achievement and Hizballah’s perception of defeat.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.