Because of the Sukkot holiday, the death of Yahya Sinwar, the attack on Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence (see below), and other developments, it’s easy to forget some of last week’s events. One that certainly deserves further attention is a leaked October 13 letter to Israel from Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense of Lloyd Austin, accusing it (based on highly dubious evidence) of having “contributed to starvation and widespread suffering” in Gaza, and “particularly in the enclave’s north,” where the IDF has renewed intensive activity. The letter threatens the cutting off of the resupply of munitions if Jerusalem doesn’t take appropriate steps within 30 days. Noah Rothman argues that the Biden administration is presenting Israel with “an impossible conundrum.”

If Israel has just 30 days to wrap up new counterinsurgency operations in the Gaza Strip’s northern territories, it would have to do so with unnecessary disregard for the lives of both the IDF and Gaza’s civilians. Speedy military operations in densely populated urban areas are also bloody operations, and the Biden administration would surely react with just as much horror to that outcome as it has to the tactics Israel is presently employing. But a more methodical approach designed to preserve as much life as possible may extend beyond Washington’s arbitrary timeline.

What’s more, the circumstances that are contributing to Washington’s apprehension may be yet another product of an imperfect information environment and the selective interpretation of facts on the ground by Israel’s monomaniacal critics in the UN.

[But] the impression that the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe looms forever just over the horizon appears to be an impression the administration wants to cultivate.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.