Addressing the United Nations yesterday, the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on the General Assembly to recommend the use of force to stop Israel from fighting back against Hamas, Hizballah, and other terrorist groups. This, however, is mere rhetoric, unlikely to translate into real action. Perhaps more consequential are Erdogan’s educational reforms, which could poison future reconciliation between Jerusalem and Ankara with their powerful strain of anti-Israel indoctrination. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak observes how this curriculum evokes the Ottoman victory over British forces at Gallipoli during World War I:

[I]n its quest to create its own ideal pan-Islamist Turkish citizen, Erdoğan’s Ministry of National Education had no problem associating Gallipoli with Gaza. By referencing the Gallipoli War Monument, which features the symbolic war helmets of soldiers who joined the Ottoman army from Jerusalem and Gaza, the ministry sought to emphasize the brotherly relations between Turks and Palestinians. This was done while completely disregarding their betrayal and collaboration with British forces during the Arab Revolt of 1916–1918, which led to Ottoman-Turkish casualties and the loss of the entire Middle East.

In addition, by drawing this parallel between Gallipoli and Gaza, the ministry reiterated President Erdoğan’s April 17 speech in the parliament that equated Hamas with the Turkish independence-war fighters. This comparison implicitly seeks to delegitimize Israel.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.