Last week, the stability of Israel’s governing coalition was severely shaken following the withdrawal from the Knesset agenda of a bill that would continue daycare subsidies for haredi children whose parents don’t serve in the military. This is but another example of how contentious this issue has become due to the vast manpower demands on the IDF during the past year of war. Yehoshua Pfeffer, a haredi rabbi, judge, and intellectual, calls on members of his own community to rethink their attitudes toward conscription:

A fateful choice now lies before the haredi Jewish community: . . . we are called upon to take responsibility for our reality. . . .

[A]rmy service touches our core identity: no longer a separatist communal identity, but a national one; no longer a haredi, insular identity, but a Jewish-Israeli one. Military service declares a deep partnership with the state, far beyond the incidental relationship of an average taxpayer—hence the profound opposition to military service.

The problem, however, is that we are unwilling to speak in these terms, in the language of sincerity. We cannot declare that we are not part of the state, for reality denies it: we are a significant portion of Israel’s government, including ministers and cabinet members; we make up nearly 15 percent of the population (and a far large proportion of those receiving welfare payments); and many of us feel Israeli and are proud of it. On the other hand, we struggle to grant official recognition to Israeli identity, which could harm the fragile walls of isolation and threaten the communal (and exilic) identity of haredi Judaism. Lacking sincerity, we are overly occupied with unconvincing justifications for our refusal to enlist.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.