Having suffered numerous setbacks in the past several months, Iran now finds itself in a weaker position than when Donald Trump first came to office in 2017. Hal Brands considers how the second Trump administration might best take advantage of the new situation:

The U.S. could . . . make clear that, along with Israel, it will hold Iran directly responsible for proxy attacks—a precedent Trump set by killing General Qassem Suleimani in 2020—rather than giving Tehran strategic immunity by responding only against the proxies themselves. And the U.S. might give Israel additional arms and intelligence for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities—perhaps even joining that attack itself—unless Tehran accepts a tougher nuclear deal than the one Trump exited in 2018.

[In addition], expect Trump to pick up Biden’s push for a regional grand bargain—diplomatic normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia, coupled with enhanced U.S. defense and technological ties to the Saudis—that would consolidate the anti-Iran coalition.

Given that Iran, China, Russia and North Korea are co-operating more closely, weakening Tehran would also weaken this larger autocratic coalition. But as ever in the Middle East, don’t downplay the complications.

Iran is weak but not impotent. It won’t sit passively as Washington crushes its economy and Israel bludgeons its allies. Iran could respond by lobbing more missiles at Israel, targeting U.S. allies or military bases in the Persian Gulf, or perhaps even making a break for the nuclear bomb. Any of these moves could trigger the big, ugly war Trump aims to avoid. The Middle East has changed, but it’s still the Middle East—where the most ambitious plans so easily go awry.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.