Since the beginning of 2024, writes Eliot Cohen, the IDF has changed the way it sees its battle with Hamas, Hizballah, and the Houthis, and how it fights it:

The Israeli high command now sees all of these conflicts as elements of a single, multi-front war with Iran. It believes that the preparation for the Hamas attack was intimately tied to Hizballah, which is, in turn, an Iranian proxy. It believes, moreover, that the purpose of these attacks, over the next few years, was not to inflict damage upon Israel, but to destroy it. “They thought they could conquer Israel,” one sobered general told me. “I had not fully understood that.”

A Hizballah attack would have followed the same pattern as Hamas’s assault—launched along the entire border, from an extensive tunnel system and mustering points concealed within civilian buildings. Had both attacks occurred simultaneously, Israel’s situation might well have been an order of magnitude more dire than it was on October 7.

Israel is now fighting a different kind of war, which has elicited a different Israeli mindset. “We’re no longer afraid of casualties,” a hard-bitten colonel told me. “I lost ten guys, and nothing stopped. We don’t go to the funerals; we’ll visit after the war.” This is a fundamental change from the Israel of October 6, 2023. Israel is girding itself for the daunting prospect of a long war against Iran, even as its immediate conflicts with Hamas and Hizballah cannot be swiftly and decisively wrapped up, no matter what American and European leaders might wish.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.