For over a month the IDF has been engaged in intense fighting in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, centered on the city of Jabaliya. The military reports that it has killed hundreds of terrorists, but the Israeli death toll has also been higher than usual. To some, the ongoing battle is a sign of failure: Hamas managed to reemerge in strength, well-organized and resilient after more than a year of fighting, in the part of Gaza that the IDF took first. To others, it is a sign of continued success: a slow and systematic campaign has trapped a large fighting force and driven it out of the tunnels, exposing it to attack and destruction.

I’ll leave this dispute to the experts. But I certainly learned something from Yoav Zitun’s analysis of Israeli tactics:

The IDF estimates that 500–600 terrorists remain entrenched within the core of Jabaliya’s refugee camp or in nearby towns such as Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun, with some blending into the civilian population still present in the area.

Despite most residents having been evacuated, Israeli forces continue to face numerous challenges in their prolonged operation in Jabaliya, with explosive traps posing the greatest threat. Since the beginning of the raid, IDF forces have discovered over 200 booby-trapped buildings in the area. In two incidents, explosives were triggered inside homes, killing six soldiers.

As the operation continues with no clear end in sight, commanders in the field are unsure how long they will need to remain in Jabaliya. “In previous operations, we didn’t reach Hamas’s core areas here, but that’s what we’re doing now,” they explained. “Hamas has surrounded these areas with large rings of booby traps, and in recent days, civilians have been killed by these devices. According to testimonies from hundreds of detainees, Hamas terrorists have also executed civilians who attempted to flee the city.”

Central to this operation is Israeli control of the Netzarim corridor—established early in the war—which runs east-west through the Strip and cuts off its northern third, including Jabaliya, from the rest. Lazar Berman spoke with a tank officer operating there:

Hamas, though significantly weakened, is still able to initiate attacks in central Gaza. . . . “In general, their motivation is high to act and try to create victory images, and to create achievements,” said Lieutenant Colonel Dori.

In the area where he was operating, Hamas gunmen “are still working as a system and trying to carry out attacks,” Dori said, but generally avoid direct confrontation with troops. . . . Dori believes finishing off Hamas is achievable, but not at all imminent: “We are continuing to take apart its capabilities. It takes time; it’s long and hard, no question. But it’s not endless. We strike hard in the areas where we know they are organizing, and destroy more weapons. . . . The Netzarim corridor is a bone in Hamas’s throat.”

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.