Normally, a cease-fire agreement is concluded by the two belligerent parties. But when it comes to Israel, normal diplomatic rules never seem to apply. Noah Rothman notes that this deal was reached by Israel and Lebanon with French and American guarantees: 

The problem with this arrangement is that Israel was never at war with the Lebanese government. It embarked on a campaign of hostilities against Hizballah, a distinct terrorist entity over which Beirut has limited influence.

The deal, which treats Hizballah as an adjacent third party to the conflict, compels it to end its armed presence near Israel and relocate its heavy weapons north of the Litani. That’s a familiar demand—one that is codified in the tragically unenforced United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Perhaps that’s why the terrorist entity does not seem all that displeased by recent developments.

Why then would Israel agree to the same terms of the 2006 deal that brought about the current crisis? Ron Ben-Yishai writes:

The current agreement carries importance in two key areas. First, it ends the ongoing fighting, allowing the IDF to reorganize for more effective border defense while enhancing intelligence capabilities to detect Hizballah violations as they occur. This would enable Israel to act swiftly against infractions while Hizballah remains weakened and unable to mount a strong response.

Rothman, Ben-Yishai, and many Israelis agree that neither Lebanon nor the UN, France, or America can be expected to enforce the deal, and Hizballah can’t be expected to uphold it. Therefore, Ben-Yishai writes, what matters most are Israel’s actions:

According to reports, Israel will have immediate response and enforcement rights if Hizballah attacks its sovereignty or citizens using rockets, mortars, anti-tank missiles, explosives planted along the border, or infiltrations into its territory. However, Israel already possesses the inherent right to respond to such blatant violations. Instead of delivering a decisive and destructive response to border breaches or rocket fire—often carried out by Palestinians under Hizballah’s direction—Israel has repeatedly opted for restraint.

Israel’s natural right to self-defense does not require codification in any agreement. . . . What Israel’s leadership—especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—needs is the resolve to stop tolerating such violations and to respond firmly. The real challenge lies in addressing the more subtle, long-term violations that Hizballah has engaged in for years, building its infrastructure above and below ground, often concealed within Shiite villages near the border and surrounding wilderness.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.