Normally, a cease-fire agreement is concluded by the two belligerent parties. But when it comes to Israel, normal diplomatic rules never seem to apply. Noah Rothman notes that this deal was reached by Israel and Lebanon with French and American guarantees: 

The problem with this arrangement is that Israel was never at war with the Lebanese government. It embarked on a campaign of hostilities against Hizballah, a distinct terrorist entity over which Beirut has limited influence.

The deal, which treats Hizballah as an adjacent third party to the conflict, compels it to end its armed presence near Israel and relocate its heavy weapons north of the Litani. That’s a familiar demand—one that is codified in the tragically unenforced United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701. Perhaps that’s why the terrorist entity does not seem all that displeased by recent developments.

Why then would Israel agree to the same terms of the 2006 deal that brought about the current crisis? Ron Ben-Yishai writes:

The current agreement carries importance in two key areas. First, it ends the ongoing fighting, allowing the IDF to reorganize for more effective border defense while enhancing intelligence capabilities to detect Hizballah violations as they occur. This would enable Israel to act swiftly against infractions while Hizballah remains weakened and unable to mount a strong response.

Rothman, Ben-Yishai, and many Israelis agree that neither Lebanon nor the UN, France, or America can be expected to enforce the deal, and Hizballah can’t be expected to uphold it. Therefore, Ben-Yishai writes, what matters most are Israel’s actions:

According to reports, Israel will have immediate response and enforcement rights if Hizballah attacks its sovereignty or citizens using rockets, mortars, anti-tank missiles, explosives planted along the border, or infiltrations into its territory. However, Israel already possesses the inherent right to respond to such blatant violations. Instead of delivering a decisive and destructive response to border breaches or rocket fire—often carried out by Palestinians under Hizballah’s direction—Israel has repeatedly opted for restraint.

Israel’s natural right to self-defense does not require codification in any agreement. . . . What Israel’s leadership—especially Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—needs is the resolve to stop tolerating such violations and to respond firmly. The real challenge lies in addressing the more subtle, long-term violations that Hizballah has engaged in for years, building its infrastructure above and below ground, often concealed within Shiite villages near the border and surrounding wilderness.

In October, a young Mauritanian national murdered an Orthodox Jewish man on his way to synagogue in Chicago. This alone should be sufficient sign of the rising dangers of anti-Semitism. Nathan Diament explains how the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act (AAA) can, if passed, make American Jews safer:

We were off to a promising start when the AAA sailed through the House of Representatives in the spring by a generous vote of 320 to 91, and 30 senators from both sides of the aisle jumped to sponsor the Senate version. Then the bill ground to a halt.

Fearful of antagonizing their left-wing activist base and putting vulnerable senators on the record, especially right before the November election, Democrats delayed bringing the AAA to the Senate floor for a vote. Now, the election is over, but the political games continue.

You can’t combat anti-Semitism if you can’t—or won’t—define it. Modern anti-Semites hide their hate behind virulent anti-Zionism. . . . The Anti-Semitism Awareness Act targets this loophole by codifying that the Department of Education must use the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s working definition of anti-Semitism in its application of Title VI.