In the Knesset this week, a piece of legislation known as “Rabbis Bill II,” has been making its way toward a final vote in the Knesset. Sam Sokol explains the original version of the legislation, advanced by the Sephardi haredi party Shas:

It aimed to create hundreds of publicly funded jobs for rabbis, while giving the Chief Rabbinate of Israel considerable say in the appointment of all new municipal rabbis, prompting criticism that its purpose was to provide jobs for Shas apparatchiks. It also lowered the minimum number of women on the rabbinical appointment boards from 40 percent to one-third, and essentially granted appointees guaranteed positions until the age of seventy-five.

Objections came from those concerned about the position of women, the extent of the expenditures involved, and preserving the independence of local rabbis—the last rooted in traditions going back to antiquity. In response to criticism, the governing coalition withdrew the bill, and Shas produced the revised version now before the Knesset, which is at the very least less objectionable on these grounds. Yet the outcome is not clear, and things beside principle are at stake:

Though it didn’t earn the same level of criticism as its predecessor, . . . the second Rabbis Bill also fell victim to opposition from within the coalition—with National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir torpedoing the bill on three separate occasions in July as part of an effort to exert leverage on Prime Minister Netanyahu in an unrelated political feud.

Ben-Gvir’s objection points to an issue more urgent, and perhaps more consequential, than the questions of religion and state, the nature of the government-sponsored rabbinate, or the national budget: the survival of the governing coalition. Sokol continues:

“There is no coalition, there is no discipline, and the most frustrating thing is that Likud is a party made up of 35 separate factions,” one Shas official told national broadcaster Kan, warning that “the complete dissolution of the coalition is only a matter of time.”

If he is right, and the country must hold new elections, the results could be far-reaching.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.