Earlier this year, the Biden administration was speaking of a multilateral grand bargain that would end the fighting in Gaza, secure the release of Israeli hostages, and normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Hopes for such an outcome have long since petered out. But, contrary to what many have predicted, improved relations between Riyadh and Jerusalem remain possible, writes Marina Barats:

Indeed, despite demands to suspend arms exports to Israel, calls for a two-state solution, and recent accusations of Israeli “genocide” in Gaza, Saudi Arabia has not responded with action. In fact, it was among the countries that blocked motions calling to cut ties with Israel and prevent it from receiving arms from nearby U.S. bases at the joint Organization of Islamic Cooperation-Arab League summit in November 2023. Ultimately it seems the two nations’ shared economic and security concerns will persist beyond the conflict.

While expansion of the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia should remain the goal for both the U.S. and for Israel, Barats argues that there are many less glamorous, but no less substantive, steps that can be taken in the nearer term:

Even without normalization, there is potential for greater economic and security cooperation . . . that may be advanced with proactive leadership from the White House. Building on that, political normalization and economic cooperation through a free-trade agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia, driven by a combination of commercial and security factors, may act as a precursor to stable peace between the two states.

Both countries have the capacity to contribute to the other’s development and security goals. They have commercial incentives for cooperation and do not perceive each other as security threats because they have common enemies (radical Islamism, Iran and its proxies), common allies (the U.S.), and an interest in regional stability.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”