On December 3, the French president Emmanuel Macron announced that he and the Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman will be convening a summit in June to plot a path toward the establishment of a Palestinian state. Why President Macron believes such an outcome is desirable, or how he thinks he can bring it about, remains a mystery. Ayoob Kara observes the wide gap between Macron’s idealistic statements and his government’s actual polices:

Macron has been highly critical of Iran’s missile program. Ahead of the ceasefire signed between Hizballah and Israel, the French president called upon the Iranian leadership to urge its proxies to support a ceasefire. . . . And, as we speak, the European Union, of which France is a member, is beefing up sanctions against Iran because of its nefarious activities in the Middle East.

Despite all of France’s rhetoric against the mullahs, [however], Macron is engaging in secret talks with Iran via Armenia.

As Kara explains, Macron appears to be doing something with Iran that is similar to what he is doing with the Kremlin: loudly expressing support for Ukraine and calling for increased EU sanctions on Moscow, while allowing his own country to conduct extensive trade with Russia.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.