Yesterday, Israel launched a wave of airstrikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen—destroying ports and other civilian infrastructure in the areas under their control with the aim of cutting off their weapons supplies. The Houthis appear to have increased their drone and missile attacks on Israel and, as IDF jets were already headed to Yemen, one such missile was already flying toward Israel; although it was intercepted, debris struck a school near Tel Aviv.

Tamir Hayman argues that Jerusalem will need to take more aggressive action still against the Iran-backed jihadists:

Two critical elements have been entirely absent in the campaign against the Houthis. One is striking the sender, Iran, which funds and orchestrates the missiles from Yemen. Both the international coalition [patrolling the sea lines the Houthis have effectively closed] and Israel have responded directly to the proxy rather than to the hand rocking the cradle. Second, there has been no effort to destroy the Houthis’ command and control or significantly degrade their military power.

What should be done? A sustained campaign is needed, not just a single operation. . . . Israel must conduct a military campaign that targets the Houthis as a cohesive military system. . . . [I]t’s necessary to demonstrate a different kind of strength against them, including actions on the ground by the navy, such as targeting commanders, eroding capabilities, and emphasizing that a maritime blockade on Israel comes with a heavy price.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.