In December of 2016, the late Jimmy Carter published an op-ed in the New York Times about the Israel-Palestinian conflict, in which he, naturally, touted his achievement in mediating the 1978 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. But it was the accompanying graphic, of a mother bird feeding an olive branch to two nestlings, that revealed much about Carter’s thinking:

If you take the image seriously, it’s clear that the mother bird is America, the larger chick Israel, and the smaller one the Palestinians. In other words, the two parties to the conflict are helpless infants—unable to fly—who need an attentive America to feed them peace. Such is the attitude not only of Carter but of much U.S. policy over the past half-century, with Barack Obama being one of the worst offenders. Israel needs America to force it, like an uncooperative child, to act in its own (supposed) best interests by taking the “tough steps” for peace. And the helpless Palestinians need their “mother” to gift-wrap statehood for them.

And then there’s the second graphic, appearing on the left-hand side of the page. It’s a photo of Menachem Begin exchanging an awkward embrace with Anwar Sadat at Camp David. Carter stands to the side, foolish grin on his face, clapping. This image quite nicely captures how the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty . . . came to be in the first place. Sadat and Begin laid the groundwork for peace behind Carter’s back, in no small part because Sadat wanted to be spared Carter’s ill-conceived attempts at international arm-twisting. Only afterward were the Americans invited to help work through the details. In other words: Sadat and Begin made peace; Carter applauded from the sidelines.

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.