Turkey has been up to quite a lot recently, having played an important role in helping the Syrian insurgent groups that have, over the past week, scored a series of remarkable military successes. They now control both Aleppo and Hama, two of Syria’s four major cities. While one cannot but take heart at the defeats inflicted on Bashar al-Assad, a monstrous dictator and a crucial member of the Iranian-led axis that has been terrorizing Israel, commentators have warned that these insurgents are largely radical Sunni Islamists, with ties to al-Qaeda and even Islamic State. Their possible victory should also be cause for concern.
Nonetheless, argues Amos Yadlin, this is a case where Assad, the devil we know, is undoubtedly worse than the devil we don’t. Thanks to the insurgent victories, the chances that the Israel-Lebanon cease-fire will
restrain Hizballah in the long term are increasing—as the process of its military recovery, after the war with Israel, will be slowed, and its residual capabilities may be redirected to the Syrian civil war. At the same time, Iran’s appetite for continuing cycles of threats and blows with Israel is expected to wane further after Israel’s effective strikes within its territory in October, which have already cooled its enthusiasm.
As the entire axis weakens, and its updated priorities focus on Syria, Hamas in Gaza is pushed to the bottom of the list, after the connection between Gaza and Lebanon has already been severed.
As to the argument that stable rule under Assad (and the Iranian proxies who keep him power) is better than chaos, Yadlin writes:
Assad, who massacred half a million of Syria’s citizens and used chemical weapons against them, is not exactly preserving stability in the country. He is a central figure in the axis that poses the most significant strategic threat to Israel, and most of Hizballah’s weapons have come from his production lines, his warehouses, or from Iran through Syrian territory. The ties between the Alawite regime in Syria and the mullah regime in Tehran are deep, and all the efforts by Israel, pragmatic Arab countries, and Western powers over decades to distance Syria from Iran have been in vain.
Most importantly, unlike Iran and Assad’s regime, the rebels do not have a nuclear program, ballistic missiles, or advanced weapons factories, nor do they have global or regional powers behind them willing to invest billions in them.
More about: Bashar al-Assad, Israeli Security, Syrian civil war