In December, the Israeli Defense Ministry announced that it would buy tens of thousands of new standard-issue rifles from a domestic manufacturer, instead of importing them from the U.S. And on Tuesday, it sealed a deal with Elbit—known for its drones and other advanced military technology—for the manufacture of heavy bombs and the raw materials used for producing rocket and missile fuel. The goal of these measures isn’t to make American military assistance unnecessary, but to lessen Israel’s dependence.

The editors of the Jerusalem Post consider the event last March that made it “painfully evident” that this dependence had become a problem:

three soldiers were killed and another fourteen were wounded when an explosion went off in a booby-trapped building in Khan Yunis. In the debate that followed the incident over why the IDF sent in troops to destroy the building, rather than doing it from the air, one reason proffered was that the IDF was reserving the type of bomb that would have been needed to level the building for other operations. In other words, Israel was afraid of running out of bombs, and the IDF was carefully monitoring its supply of ordnance to be able to fight a long war on numerous fronts.

The long-term danger of this type of dependence on the U.S. for arms became even more acutely evident in November, when Senator Bernie Sanders sponsored three different bills that would have embargoed future arms sales to Israel. . . . Though the bills were roundly defeated, about one-third of Democratic senators voted for the measures, something that justifiably causes concern when considering whether the U.S. will continue to be as forthcoming in its sale of arms to Israel a decade from now.

No country, especially not one of Israel’s size, can attain full weapons independence. But at the same time, this dependence can be reduced, so as to decrease the amount of leverage other nations—even friendly ones like the U.S—can have on Israel’s decision-making process during times of war.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.