Prior to October 7, observes Grant Rumley, Chinese diplomats were accustomed to “calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly” when speaking of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. They have since shifted more firmly to the anti-Israel side, both because of China’s alliance with Russia and Iran, and also, presumably, to garner sympathy from anti-Semitic constituencies in the Muslim world and in the West:

China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region. . . . Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own.

For this reason alone, Israel and America should be wary of China’s efforts to insert itself into the power vacuum in Syria. Rumley continues:

China will undoubtedly try to position itself with whatever governing authority emerges in Syria. Beijing will be able to offer recognition and reconstruction aid, as well as a friendly voice should the emerging new Syrian leadership seek a non-Western voice of support. [But] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine overburdened its economy and military, creating an overreliance on China, Iran, and North Korea. Many Syrians may be loath to embrace Beijing too closely, given its ties to Moscow and Tehran. This . . . presents an opportunity for the U.S. and other Western countries to drive a wedge between the new Syrian government and its traditional backers.

The incoming Trump administration has a rare opportunity. Donald Trump may believe that Syria is “not our fight,” but the competition with China is very much ours and will undoubtedly be a focus of his administration. Here, in Syria, is an opportunity for the U.S. to increase its position at the expense of China.

How did Qatar, an American ally, become the nerve center of the leading Palestinian jihadist organization? Natalie Ecanow explains.

When Jordan expelled Hamas in 1999, Qatar offered sanctuary to the group, which had already become notorious for using suicide-bombing attacks over the previous decade. . . . Hamas chose to relocate to Syria. However, that arrangement lasted for only a decade. With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the terror group found its way back to Qatar.

In 2003, Hamas leaders reportedly convened in Qatar after the IDF attempted to eliminate Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, following a Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem that killed seven people, including two American citizens. This episode led to one of the first efforts by Qatar to advocate for its terror proxy.

Thirteen years and five wars between Hamas and Israel later, Qatar’s support for Hamas has not waned. . . . To this day, Qatari officials maintain that the office came at the “request from Washington to establish indirect lines of communication with Hamas.” However, an Obama White House official asserted that there was never any request from Washington. . . . Inexplicably, the United States government continues to rely on Qatar to negotiate for the release of the hostages held by Hamas, even as the regime hosts the terror group’s political elite.

A reckoning is needed between our two countries. Congressional hearings, legislation, executive orders, and other measures to regulate relations between our countries are long overdue.