Monday is the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, and International Holocaust Remembrance Day. As has been the case for many years, a ceremony will be held at the most famous of Nazi death camps. Yet the leader of the Jewish state will be absent, because the Polish government—thanks to a warrant from the International Criminal Court (ICC)—will arrest him if he sets foot in the country. To Natan Sharansky, it “would be hard to contrive a crueler or more emblematic set of ironies” than the spurious charges of genocide being leveled against the Jewish state, and their perverse results:

This outcome reflects the victory of a decades-long campaign by Israel’s enemies to delegitimize, demonize, and apply double standards to the Jewish state. . . . As a result, while Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran are currently losing the battle to destroy Israel militarily, they have been given hope of winning on another front, that of global public opinion.

The countries most responsible for giving them this hope—another irony—are the major powers, particularly Britain, France, and Germany, who have the clout to determine whether such legal tactics will succeed. The leaders of these countries have all admitted in one way or another that they do not agree with the ICC warrants. Nevertheless, they claim they have to follow them in order to preserve international law and the peace and justice it supposedly promotes.

The implications of this position are becoming increasingly clear.

Soon, not only will Israeli leaders be unable to land on European soil, but nearly any Israeli who travels abroad could be subject to prosecution merely for having served in the Israel Defense Forces given Israel’s mandatory conscription. We are already beginning to see this process unfold.

While international law and institutions were intended to promote peace, they have been co-opted by those who seek the destruction of the Jewish state.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.