Currently, the Israeli minister of strategic affairs Ron Dermer is in the U.S. to discuss negotiations for phase two of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire deal with the American envoy Steve Witkoff. Although, after 504 days, Hamas still has not released all the hostages, and Qatar has not arrested Hamas leaders living under its protection or frozen their bank accounts, the emirate will play a key role as mediator in these negotiations. It should be apparent by this time that Qatar has not made any serious threats to these arch-terrorists. (Besides extradition to the U.S. or Israel, Qatar could threaten to transport them to Lebanon or Syria, where the IDF could easily eliminate them.) In short, this nominal American ally is not a good-faith partner.

But the problems caused by this evil monarchy go even further, as Hussein Aboubakr Mansour explains:

If Trump expects Arab leaders to help solve the Gaza crisis, he must also pressure Qatar to rein in its propaganda networks and ongoing alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. These networks, notably Al Jazeera, have long used the Palestinian quagmire as a cudgel to hammer other Arab regimes, portraying them as complicit in Israel’s siege or indifferent to Palestinian suffering. In so doing, they undermine rival governments that are already wary of a backlash from their own citizens and the broader Arab street.

Qatar’s posture in the Middle East has always involved a delicate balancing act. On the one hand, Doha flaunts its relations with Washington, hosts a major U.S. military base, and positions itself as a modernizing, business-friendly emirate. On the other, it funds and gives shelter to Islamist groups, from the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas to more extreme jihadists.

Historically, the United States has treated Doha with kid gloves. Qatar invests heavily in American real estate, business ventures, universities, and, not least, lavish lobbying campaigns in Washington. Over the years, an array of Beltway insiders, think tanks, and political influencers have found themselves on Qatari payrolls, enjoying lucrative consulting contracts that often hamper scrutiny of Doha’s double-dealings.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.