Yesterday, Jordan’s King Abdullah II met with President Trump at the White House, and announced that he has agreed to bring 2,000 Gazan children to his country for medical treatment. Ghaith al-Omari wrote, just prior to Abdullah’s visit:

Politically, the Gaza war spurred the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood [in Jordan], who mirrored Hamas’s talking points and leveraged the public outcry over Israel’s military operations to their benefit. Amman bears part of the blame for this trend. Jordanian officials have harshly criticized Israel during the war, arguing that this approach was needed to contain public anger. Yet by riding the wave of popular discontent, they also fed that wave, reinforcing the Brotherhood’s message. . . . In the West Bank, growing instability could eventually spill over into Jordan—a threat that is further complicated by Amman’s very tense political relations with Israel.

And then yesterday Abdullah sat through a press conference while the president spoke of his commitment to the depopulation of Gaza. Al-Omari explains why Jordan objects to the plan, and how it should respond:

Trump’s proposal poses genuine threats to the kingdom’s national security. . . . One thing is clear: transferring Gazans to Jordan would inevitably help Hamas reestablish a foothold in the kingdom, which authorities have been diligently combating since expelling the terrorist group’s leaders in 1999.

What is needed is a detailed, practical, coordinated approach by likeminded Arab governments, and Trump’s proposal has put the ball squarely in their court to come up with alternatives. What the king can—and should—do is present practical ideas for what he is willing to do in Gaza, consistent with Jordan’s modest capabilities.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.