Last month, a Chinese company called DeepSeek launched R1, an artificial-intelligence assistant similar to ChatGPT, which generated much media attention and was widely downloaded in the U.S. DeepSeek claimed that the program’s training (i.e., the process whereby large amounts of information are fed into its algorithms) could be done with far less computing power than is used for the competing software—and therefore far more cheaply.

Ariel Sobelman and Michael Genkin discuss what this development might mean for Israeli technology, both economically and in terms of the security and diplomatic concerns surrounding Israel-China trade.

If a Chinese company managed to develop a leading AI model at a low cost and without access to advanced chips, then perhaps Israel could follow a similar path. . . . Israel’s Ministry of Innovation and Science respond[ed] to DeepSeek’s R1 launch by stating that, “For Israel, the Chinese model presents a promising horizon, suggesting that the country could become a global AI leader without requiring massive investments, which have so far been a significant barrier to independent entry into this elite club.”

Initial independent assessments, [however], suggest that DeepSeek’s performance may not be as impressive as claimed.

Since its most important ally, the United States, has imposed restrictions on its access to advanced AI hardware, some may be tempted to explore Chinese technologies, such as Huawei chips or partnerships with Chinese AI firms, to advance Israel’s capabilities. Such a course of action would be a serious miscalculation, and it is critical for both Israel and the United States to prevent this outcome.

Israel must adjust its national AI strategy to address the critical infrastructure challenges [it faces]. This will strengthen its position in AI, increase its value as a U.S. partner, and enable groundbreaking regional collaborations, including with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”