One possibility is that President Trump’s Gaza plan is a starting point for negotiations. Therein, writes Lazar Berman, lies an opportunity for Benjamin Netanyahu:

Israel’s demands for Gaza—Hamas leaders in exile, its fighters disarmed, and a new international consortium overseeing the Strip—may suddenly seem reasonable and desirable to regional players compared to Trump’s suggestion. Moreover, the prime minister can curry favor in Egypt and Jordan if he quietly moves Trump away from the expulsion idea.

Einat Wilf, by contrast, outlines a more concrete plan, within Trump’s framework, to end the Palestinian “politics of destruction.”

Gaza’s inhabitants, regardless [of whether] they are given temporary or permanent refuge in other Arab countries, and even if they just remain in Gaza, must be struck from UNRWA’s records as refugees and must each individually recognize that they possess no such thing as a “right of return” into Israel.

In return for that, and only after this is done, each Gaza resident receives a unit of property rights (such as an apartment) to be realized when Gaza is rebuilt. That right can then be realized or sold, but it is a simple property right in Gaza, where Gaza is home, not a destructive vision of “return” to somewhere else.

[Moreover], if I were Jordan, I would finally recognize how valuable Gaza is and I will make a play for it—offer to provide temporary or permanent refuge to Gazans—and in return take over Gaza as a Jordanian foot in the Mediterranean. . . . And if I’m Egypt, I would try to prevent Jordan from doing this, and offer to take over Gaza myself.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.