For much of the world, insofar as it is paying attention to the Middle East, the big story is about President Trump’s plans for the Gaza Strip. But, Michael Mandelbaum argues, the fate of Gaza isn’t the most pressing question Washington faces when considering the region. The first of these, according to Mandelbaum, is Palestinian statehood, which Arab governments—and especially Saudi Arabia—seek to put back on the table:

On the Palestinian question, a succession of American presidents, going back decades, has held two convictions: first, that its resolution—which all of them came to believe entailed creating a Palestinian state—was imperative for the peace of the region and American interests there; and second, that establishing such a state was eminently feasible. Both propositions were and are false.

To his credit, President Trump has shown no sign of sharing the erroneous if persistent beliefs of his predecessors, but he risks getting bogged down in the Palestinian question all the same. . . . Since a Saudi-Israeli peace agreement would be the crowning achievement of Trump’s Middle East diplomacy, he has a powerful incentive to pursue it; but doing so could once again ensnare him and the United States in a futile effort to establish such a state.

Even more important than the danger posed by such efforts is the danger of Iran building nuclear weapons. Mandelbaum explains that this possibility can only be averted with military action or a credible threat thereof.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.