Benjamin Netanyahu landed in Washington yesterday in advance of his upcoming meeting with Donald Trump—making him the first foreign leader the new president will receive since returning to the White House. Key to their discussions, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, is the implementation of the second phase of the three-phase cease-fire, the fine points of which remain to be worked out:

Hamas seeks to secure its survival as a political entity in Gaza. Meanwhile, Israel, with U.S. support, will aim to prevent that outcome—not only by ensuring Hamas is excluded from Gaza’s civilian governance but also by blocking any military resurgence.

[But] the negotiations over implementing phase 2 of the hostage deal are unlikely to succeed unless one side radically shifts its position. The chances of influencing Hamas are minimal, yet Israel has an interest in keeping the group intact until the second phase is completed. This is because a party is needed to facilitate the return of all hostages—both the living and the dead—one that can be somewhat relied upon and pressured by mediators when necessary, as was the case at the start of the current phase.

However, one key point of contention remains: Trump is determined to end the war—almost at any cost—while Israel refuses to do so until Hamas is militarily and politically dismantled beyond recovery and all hostages are returned. The core issue in Gaza’s postwar arrangement is thus a matter of sequencing—whether the war should end before Hamas loses its grip on Gaza or only after its total collapse.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.