When Jordan and Egypt were mentioned as possible destinations for refugees from Gaza—whether temporary or permanent—both countries objected strenuously. Dan Diker and Yoni Ben Menachem explain why:

Muslim Brotherhood-led protests have taken place in Jordan in support of Hamas in Gaza, threatening the stability of the monarchy. King Abdullah is deeply concerned about maintaining power. It is commonly understood and confirmed by Israeli security officials that Abdullah opposes any American initiative that could be perceived as harming Palestinian rights and interests in Gaza as well as the West Bank. Abdullah’s position is a reflection of the regime’s fragility and fears of self-preservation.

[Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah] el-Sisi faces a similar predicament. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt also poses a threat to regime stability. Both leaders are actively seeking ways to remove the plan from the U.S. Middle East agenda.

Egypt and Jordan, [however], rely heavily on annual U.S. economic and military aid. President Trump’s recent decision to cut off foreign aid to Jordan sends a powerful message to these countries and others in the region.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.