After attending a swearing-in ceremony for the IDF’s new haredi brigade—which, unlike its precursors, appears to be attracting members of the haredi mainstream—Yehoshua Pfeffer observes the way his community is fundamentally changing in its relationship with its fellow citizens. He chalks some of it up to simultaneous changes in non-haredi society:

Israel’s population has turned distinctly rightwards, a shift caused by demographics, the collapse of the peace movement, a disillusionment with the liberal left, and other factors. The Knesset, the army, the [the popular IDF radio station’s] playlist, and other national and cultural institutions are today replete with kippah-wearers, shifting their character in tune. Given these changes, it comes as little surprise that Haredim have gradually become more Israeli.

Haredim object to the national call [of some early Zionists] to “be like the nations,” the call of those who desire a “neutral state” with some Jewish flavor that yearns to join the European Union. Their objection is less to a Jewish state per se and more to a Jewish state that doesn’t align with Jewish values as they see them. As the state moves rightwards, Haredim feel an ever-increasing sense of belonging.

The many phenomena of growing haredi participation with Israel—haredi state schools [as opposed to the standard independent haredi school network], deep government involvement, diverse workforce participation, haredi academic colleges, cultural blending, Internet access, army service, and so on—are thus set to become a paradigm shift.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.