Assuming that Hamas does not accept the cease-fire terms being offered it, and that siege tactics alone won’t be enough to bring it to its knees, the IDF will have to return to Gaza. And that possibility raises an important question: if Israel couldn’t destroy Hamas in the first fifteen months of fighting, how much could it really accomplish in a renewed offensive? In his January essay, Ran Baratz argued that winning will require a major strategic rethink. John Spencer, America’s leading expert on urban warfare, is a bit more sanguine in his discussion of the IDF’s successes so far, and what it will take to achieve victory, with Haviv Rettig Gur. Here Spencer refers to some of the responses to Baratz’s essay. (Video, 54 minutes.)

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.