On Tuesday, Russia announced its willingness to help mediate between the U.S. and Iran—an apparent response to America reportedly expressing interest in getting its help. The news comes amid indications Tehran is very close to being able to produce nuclear weapons. Ayatollah Ali Khameini would want to see a restoration of the 2015 agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which left Iran able to keep enriching uranium while promising not to use it to make bombs. But Jason M. Brodsky doesn’t think diplomacy will yield results:
Iran and the United States are talking past each other about “deals.” Iran is still speaking in the language of the JCPOA. But U.S. officials appear to have something different in mind. In a recent interview, Trump publicly disavowed the JCPOA formula, complaining about its short-term duration. This was followed by his national security advisor expressing a willingness to talk to Iran so long as Tehran wants to give up its entire nuclear program.
There is no public evidence to date that the maximum Tehran is prepared to give—a JCPOA-style arrangement—will meet the minimum the Trump administration is prepared to accept. If current positions hold, this sets the stage for a showdown, not a deal, in the near term, necessitating the development of a robust pressure architecture to further sharpen Tehran’s choices.
Meanwhile, Shay Khatiri argues that internal Iranian developments suggest an unwillingness to come to any agreement. He points especially to the firing on Sunday of the minister of economy, whose favorable attitude toward free markets contrasts with the regime’s general preference for a command economy.
The sacking highlights a change of direction in the regime’s foreign policy. . . . Gone are efforts to improve prosperity; back in fashion is the “resistance economy,” which emphasizes patriotic austerity and domestic production of foodstuffs and military goods.
Iranian hardliners do not revert to the “resistance economy” for its own sake; it usually presages an effort to defy the world. In this case, expect Iran to accelerate its nuclear-weaponization process. Khamenei believes he is paying the price, so he might as well get the goods. . . . Rather than deal, it now appears Khamenei only allows diplomacy in the hope it will delay a military attack long enough for Iran to complete its nuclear project.
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More about: Donald Trump, Iran nuclear program, U.S. Foreign policy