Less effective at dealing with self-described pro-Palestinian protesters, if also less willing to accept their demands, were the governments of American cities when these demonstrations were at their height. Anita Kinney writes:

After Hamas’s October 7, 2023 terrorist attacks, anti-Israel protesters repeatedly shut down freeways and other key infrastructure across the United States. A month later, demonstrators snarled traffic on San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge, causing, among other problems, delayed organ-transplant surgeries. In January 2024, protesters shut down I-5 in Seattle for about five hours. . . .  Swift prosecution could have deterred these freeway vigilantes, but local prosecutors initially took a light touch.

To rectify the failure to crack down on this sort of lawlessness, the Hamilton Lincoln Law Institute (HLLI) has filed two civil suits, the first of their kind:

Christopher Manhart missed a flight and subsequent business engagements after at least 40 activists swarmed an I-190 off-ramp into Chicago O’Hare International Airport. Daniel Faoro was trapped in his car for over an hour in Arlington, Virginia, while protesters blocked bridges into Washington, D.C. during rush hour. . . . HLLI has identified scores of alleged demonstrators and articulated the case against them, helping Faoro and Manhart seek compensation for false imprisonment and other wrongful behavior.

These lawsuits are based on a fundamental civil right, guaranteed by the Constitution and common law: freedom of movement. The pro-Hamas blockaders conspired to impede this right. . . . Federal prosecutors, moreover, can use the law to curb anti-Semitic lawlessness and restore law and order in American life. . . . The legal filings meticulously identify the alleged protesters, as well as the network of nonprofits that aided and abetted their conspiracies. Federal prosecutors, in other words, have much of the work done for them.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.