The Israeli government announced that it will halt humanitarian aid deliveries into Gaza if Hamas does not agree to the terms it is offering. This threat has already sparked a predictable hue and cry from the usual sources about war crimes, international law, and starving children. Of course, these accusations have been leveled for some time—including by the International Court of Justice—based on then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s declaration on October 9, 2023 of “a complete siege” on Gaza. Since that complete siege was lifted twelve days later, and Israel at the time did not control the Gaza-Egypt border, this was but another libel. And even if Israel does resort to siege tactics, Gaza at the moment has weeks’ if not months’ worth of humanitarian supplies.

Still, since the slanders are apt to come fast and thick if Israel sticks to this policy, it’s worth considering the legal questions it raises. I’ll have more on the subject in the days to come, but now I can refer you to a thorough treatment of the question by Avraham Russell Shalev from 2024:

The U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual explains the basic logic behind siege warfare: “It is lawful to besiege enemy forces, i.e., to encircle them with a view towards inducing their surrender by cutting them off from reinforcements, supplies, and communications with the outside world. In particular, it is permissible to seek to starve enemy forces into submission.”

Similar judgments can be found in the equivalent texts used by the United Kingdom and France. Moreover, the Geneva Conventions and associated documents lay out certain restrictions on siege warfare, implying that it is not ipso facto prohibited. Shalev identifies two essential points in the international law on the subject:

Humanitarian-aid obligations are passive—there is no requirement for a party actively to supply aid to enemy civilians. Rather, the obligation entails allowing the free passage of food and supplies provided by third parties unless there are valid reasons for withholding them.

The free passage of humanitarian relief is conditional.

That is, Israel would only be required to allow the influx of humanitarian aid if Hamas meets certain conditions, which Shalev examines. He concludes:

Israel’s initial closure actions appear to align with certain interpretations of the laws of armed conflict. . . . Concerns persist that the criticism of Israeli siege tactics represents a lex specialis directed solely at Israel, rather than a standard applied universally to other states in similar circumstances.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.