Mobs can get whipped into a frenzy of loathing for Israel in part because of the constant stream of online propaganda, falsehood, and misleading reporting. For instance: on March 23, Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza fired on a medical convoy, killing nine civilians and six Hamas operatives. The propagandists have taken this as proof of the IDF’s irredeemable evil, whereas it proves the exact opposite.

First, look at the much-cited fact that the soldiers immediately buried the bodies in shallow graves. Isn’t this the sort of cover-up that would follow a massacre, not a legitimate battle? Not at all. The unit was protecting the bodies from scavenging animals, and immediately informed the UN so it could identify the remains and return them to their families. One doesn’t commit a war crime and then tell the UN about it. Then there are the IDF investigations, cited by those accusing Israel of genocide—which are not at all consistent with the behavior of an army committed to mass slaughter.

Arsen Ostrovsky, John Spencer, and Brian Cox explain:

The IDF’s internal investigation concluded that the killings resulted from a series of operational errors and professional failures. IDF elements were operating in a “hostile and dangerous combat zone” and believed there to be a “tangible threat.” Soldiers misidentified the convoy of vehicles, assessing that they were being used by Hamas insurgents—a tactic the group has systematically employed since October 7, 2023.

Hamas has made a practice of blurring the lines between combatant and civilian, systematically exploiting ambulances, hospitals, and humanitarian symbols for military purposes. This tactic forces troops into impossible split-second decisions under fire—precisely the kind of dilemma that international law accounts for, but online critics ignore.

The examination into the incident was conducted by the IDF General Staff Fact-Finding Mechanism, a professional team outside the operational chain of command. Their findings . . . included operational breaches, failures to follow orders, and reporting deficiencies. As a result, the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade was dismissed, and the commander of the 14th Brigade was severely reprimanded.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.