Moving from western to eastern Africa, we come to Ethiopia, which has recently been plunged again into internecine conflict. A few thousand members of Beta Israel, as the local Jewish population call themselves, still remain in the country. Most wish to come to Israel, but bureaucratic and logistical hurdles, as well as questions about their Jewish status, have made this difficult. Richard Hidary reports on a recent visit, which began with prayer in an Addis Ababa synagogue:

We found 100 men already gathered, sitting on wooden benches, wrapped in turquoise-striped talitot, about half wearing tefillin. On the other side of a hanging cloth m’hitsah was an equal number of women in patterned long dresses and elegant white headscarves. The hazan on the front stage recited each section of the service twice: first in Amharic, a Semitic language that sounds soft and soothing, and then again in Hebrew, perfectly pronounced according to the Sephardi rite. The prayers were familiar, as were the Torah scrolls and the Koren siddurim with translation (to Amharic). Except for the fact that the prayers were twice as long due to the rendition in Amharic, I felt right at home.

But everything else was a culture shock. The synagogue roof and walls were made from corrugated metal lined with tarp and colorful cloths. One dark-brown cloth was embroidered with a memorial to relatives who had perished during the walk to Sudan. The mud floor led out to a backyard with a mikveh and an outhouse with no running water.

Since 1991, 55,000 more members of Beta Israel have made aliyah, so the total Ethiopian Jewish population in Israel has grown to 180,000 strong. Seventy-three percent of Ethiopian Israelis who have arrived since 1991 enroll their kids in religious schools—much higher than the national average—demonstrating their devotion to Torah and halakhic practice. They also serve with distinction in the IDF, volunteering in combat units that engage in some of the most difficult fighting. Although just 2 percent of the total Israeli population, Ethiopians count for a disproportionately high ratio (about 5 percent) of IDF deaths since October 7.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.