Anti-Zionist Jews today often claim, sometimes sincerely, that they are arguing for the sake of high moral principle, and indeed defending what they insist are Jewish values. Should they thus be considered part of the sort of lively but friendly debate that, we are told, characterizes Jewish tradition? Drawing on a subtler understanding of rabbinic traditions of disputation, Adam Kirsch thinks perhaps not:

Since Israel is the only Jewish country in the world and approximately one-half of the world’s Jews live there, it follows that a Jewish argument must be concerned for Israel’s safety and survival. Of course, some anti-Zionists argue that the moral and even physical well-being of Israeli Jews would be better served by a binational state. This, too, can be a disagreement for the sake of Heaven, even if the anti-Zionist side of it is thoroughly unconvincing.

But when an argument displays no genuine and realistic concern for the Jewish people—when it is animated solely by abstract ethical concerns, or sympathy for Palestinian suffering, or animus against the Israeli government—then it doesn’t exist within Jewish peoplehood but stands outside of Jewish peoplehood, even if a Jew is making it. Such critics do not practice what the political philosopher Michael Walzer calls “connected criticism,” the kind that comes from within a community and wants to improve it.

Indeed, for some of them, the main purpose of speaking out on Jewish issues is precisely to advertise their lack of connection—to show the world that they are ashamed of the Jewish people or the Jewish state, and should not be held responsible for it. But as history shows, and as we are learning again in our own day, enemies of the Jews do not make such fine distinctions.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.