In 1951, the Knesset designated the 27th day of the month of Nissan Yom ha-Zikaron la-Shoah v’la-Gvurah, the day of remembrance for the Holocaust and the heroism—the last term referring to those who took up arms against the Nazis. (On years like this, when the 27th falls on a Friday, it is observed on the 26th, which is today.) The date, Haviv Rettig Gur writes, is a specifically Zionist way of commemorating the destruction of European Jewry. Many rabbis felt that, rather than create a new day of mourning, the Holocaust should be folded into other national tragedies on the Ninth of Av. For the rest of the world, January 27—the day the Soviets liberated Auschwitz—is the International Holocaust Remembrance Day. But Israel chose this date in part for another reason:

The 27th of the month of Nissan on the Jewish calendar . . . had already been established in the pre-state Jewish community as a day “for remembrance of heroism” for those killed in the Arab Revolt of 1936, which began on the 27th of Nissan, or April 19.

In many ways . . . this transformation of the community’s existing memorial day into Yom HaShoah was a way for survivors and victims to lay claim to their trauma. And it makes Yom HaShoah something more than only a remembrance of victimhood and death. It connects destruction to rebirth, vulnerability to redemption, the death of European Jewry to the new life of Israeli Jewry. It is a day for remembering not only what was lost, but also why there are no real solutions to the problem of vulnerability except self-reliance.

Zionism, alone among Jewish movements and cultural worlds, knew what was coming. It saw only dimly, vaguely, but this foreknowledge rested on serious analysis and theory, and recommended clear action.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.