Shortly after the October 7, 2023 attacks, Israel began coordinating the delivery of massive amounts of food and other basic supplies into the Gaza Strip. These were, in practical terms, delivered to Hamas, which could then feed its fighters and sell the remaining goods to civilians, thus raising revenue and maintaining control over the population. Israel ended this policy on March 2, although it seems some supplies have entered Gaza nonetheless. Now that the IDF is preparing to resume major combat operations, it is working on a plan to distribute aid to Gazans directly.

Have Gazans been starving since March, then? Hardly, although you wouldn’t know it from reading the mainstream press. Michael Ames explains how the American government played a role in seeding this misinformation:

“Gaza Is Starving,” a headline in the New Yorker declared in early January 2024, pushing a harrowing narrative that took hold during the first six months of the war. . . . In April 2024, Samantha Power, director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Biden administration, became the first senior U.S. official to declare that famine in Gaza had begun. She cited a report published by an independent, United Nations–affiliated monitoring system, called the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Global Initiative (IPC).

In twenty years, just four famines have been confirmed by the IPC: Somalia in 2011, South Sudan in 2017 and 2020, and Sudan in 2024. A confirmed famine in Gaza, as Power told Congress was happening, would have been a historic catastrophe and the first to occur outside continental Africa. . . . But there were serious problems with Power’s sensational testimony. Foremost among them: the IPC never declared a famine in Gaza. The report she cited was a projection of possible outcomes, not a conclusive finding.

It’s an irony worth noting that Power played a major role in the direction of South Sudan during the Obama administration. Under Power’s leadership, USAID declared a famine in Gaza, leading to a formal investigation from the highly regarded Famine Review Committee (FRC):

The FRC, which functions as the IPC’s final authority and quality-control check, rebuked the USAID analysis, calling its conclusions insupportable. The failures were stunning.

Private-sector food deliveries, such as trucks contracted to commercial warehouses, were left out of the agency’s estimates of the total food supply in north Gaza. As a result, as much as 82 percent of the “daily kilocalorie requirement” in northern Gaza last April wasn’t counted. In the same month, USAID’s famine monitor also left out 940 metric tons (2 million pounds) of flour, sugar, salt, and yeast donated by the UN to bakeries in north Gaza, enough to make about 1,400 metric tons (3 million pounds) of bread.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.