When Hamas launched the present war in 2023, it hoped that it could spark an intifada in the West Bank, allowing its operatives there to seize control from the Palestinian Authority, and pursue a two-front war on Israel. It hasn’t succeeded, but it has still managed to do much damage. In January, the IDF launched a new operation there called Iron Wall, about which Amit Segal writes:

Satellite images vividly tell this story. The Jenin refugee camp no longer resembles a crowded maze of homes stacked upon each other. The IDF has created broad, clear paths to allow tanks rapid access, significantly improving mobility and response time throughout the camp.

In an important ruling, Israel’s Supreme Court recently rejected an appeal by the governor of Jenin to halt these demolitions. . . . Justice Noam Sohlberg went even further, admonishing the military—but in a manner unprecedented in Israel’s judicial history: “Since no temporary injunction was issued, the IDF should not have delayed operations awaiting our decision. Given a clear and immediate military necessity, action could and should have been taken immediately. Judicial review conducted while battles are ongoing could, God forbid, endanger soldiers’ lives.”

It’s a remarkable scene: Israel’s Supreme Court essentially urging military forces to advance promptly with armored bulldozers.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.