Having learned the lessons of the Israeli strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, and Syria’s al-Kibar reactor in 2007, Iran placed its nuclear installations in various locations, some heavily fortified and buried deep underground. One of the main sites, known as Fordow, is especially well protected, and destroying it—while a relatively straightforward task for U.S. air force—poses significant challenges to Israel. Then again, few believed Israeli jets had the capacity to strike Iran at all before last year. And last night, the IDF reportedly destroyed the air defenses near Fordow.

David Albright, a physicist by training, understands the technical aspects of the Iranian nuclear program as well as anyone in the West not employed by the Mossad. Interviewed by Armin Rosen, he assesses the damage that Israel has done so far:

The elephant in the tent is Fordow, where, if Iran continues to operate, it can break out and make weapon-grade uranium very quickly. I think on the weaponization side, the time to make the bomb has probably been extended by several months.

I think it would be very dangerous for Israel to stop right now. Iran has a big program. There are a lot of parts to it, and it just takes a significant amount of time really to set it back sufficiently to feel like the job is done. . . . It would still be very hard for Iran to move to build a bomb right now. In the long run Iran can replace the nuclear scientists killed this week, but in the short run it can’t. It’s a real shock to the system that makes the nuclear weapon itself.

Albright notes that Israel does have options when it comes to Fordow, even without American bombers and bunker-buster ordinance:

Israel could take out the ventilation system at Fordow and make it impossible really to work in that environment. I don’t understand why it hasn’t yet. It could make it inoperative and if Iran moves to fix it, it can bomb it again. . . . It could mine it during a commando raid. It could potentially crack the ceiling or undermine the support structure of the halls. It can make it very difficult to get into. Effectively that’s destroying it.

Since Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, Albright has found himself opposed to many of his fellow scientific experts on nonproliferation—who supported the deal then and criticize Israel’s actions now. He seeks to explain why:

Their fundamental belief is, “We’ve got to stop a war.” And it’s ironic that it’s people who in many cases advocate for the abolition of nuclear weapons—but when push comes to shove, when there’s really a challenge and an opportunity to end nuclear weapons, they fold and say, “Oh, we don’t want a war.”

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.