While Thunberg’s blockade-running is merely a stunt, it’s worth remembering that a similar stunt in 2010, involving the Mavi Marmara, resulted in a diplomatic rift between Jerusalem and Ankara. But stunts become far more serious when they are performed by heads of state of important countries. The French president Emmanuel Macron recently announced a conference, scheduled to take place under UN auspices, with the aim of conjuring a Palestinian state into existence. Yesterday Macron dilated further on these plans with his Brazilian counterpart, who accused Israel—not for the first time—of genocide.

David M. Weinberg comments on Macron’s maneuvers—which, like Thunberg’s, are unlikely to do much to improve the lot of Palestinians:

The fact that previous such resolutions and proclamations only have bolstered Palestinian rejection of Israel’s right to exist—and have been interpreted by Palestinians as an international a green light for the use of terror to destroy Israel—does not frighten Macron.

Nor is he dissuaded by the fact that blabbering at this moment about Palestinian statehood is the very essence of victory for Hamas terrorism and incentivizes more acts of massacre. Merely discussing Palestinian statehood now gives Hamas more sway in Palestinian politics than it ever had, especially in Judea and Samaria.

Yet Weinberg puts little stock in the proposal, floated by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, that Israel retaliate by declaring its sovereignty over parts of Judea and Samaria:

There are other just, punitive measures that Israel can and should take against countries that diplomatically assault it in the way that Macron is planning, such as closing their consulates in Jerusalem that function as “embassies” to “Palestine.”

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.