When considering how to combat the Muslim Brotherhood, the Trump administration should keep in mind that, to serve as a useful tool of foreign policy, sanctions should have a legal basis, not simply express the preferences of a given government. This would also be good advice for Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Norway, which recently announced personal sanctions on Israel’s finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, and its internal-security minister, Itamar Ben-Gvir. The editors of the Jerusalem Post explain the hypocrisy and illogic behind this unprecedented measure, which, they write, “marks a striking departure from longstanding diplomatic norms” and betrays an unhealthy obsession with Israel’s internal affairs:

Israel is not the only democracy that has had extremists in government. . . . Democracies have generally reserved sanctions for autocracies—countries like Russia, Belarus, or Myanmar. The unspoken rule was that democracies, while occasionally electing officials who say outrageous things, have internal systems—elections, courts, free media, and public opinion—to deal with them.

That doesn’t mean Smotrich and Ben-Gvir’s inflammatory rhetoric is defensible. We find some of their remarks not only irresponsible but morally wrong. However, these sanctions extend beyond disapproval of rhetoric and into the realm of sanctimonious virtue signaling.

Some of the same countries are enthusiastically engaging with the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, who, the editorial points out, “pays monthly salaries to terrorists who murder Israelis, and their families.” And when it comes to outrageous and bigoted statements, from Holocaust denial to raging about Jews who “trample” the Temple Mount “with their filthy feet”—not to mention outright incitement to violence—Abbas outdoes any Israeli politician.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.